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RE-DEMOCRATIZING PALESTINIAN
POLITICS
George E. Bisharat*

ABSTRACT
The main objective of this article is to examine the contemporary
challenges to re-democratization in Palestinian politics.
Such an
examination is timely as the current leadership of the Palestinian people,
institutionalized in the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the
Palestinian Authority (PA), is viewed by many Palestinians as out of touch
with their needs, and overly prepared to sacrifice their perceived rights and
interests in negotiations with Israel. Palestinian politics have never been
fully democratic. It follows that for Palestinian politics to be successfully
democratized today, it is not sufficient to simply return to past practices nor
to restore pre-existing institutions to their previous statuses.
This article analyzes the impact of two persistent obstacles to
Palestinian democratic development—geographic dispersion and
fragmentation of the Palestinians; and intervention by external powers,
including the Arab states, the United States, and Israel—and considers the
extent to which these obstacles were overcome in the past. It addresses the
process of de-democratization to which Palestinian political institutions and
practices have been subjected since the high water mark of Palestinian
democratic achievement during the first intifada (1987-1993).
De-democratization is evident in two processes, characterized here as
the “downsizing of Palestine” (by which Palestine has been reduced,
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presented herein. The remaining shortcomings, of course, are the sole responsibility of the
author.
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conceptually and administratively, to the West Bank) and the “domestication
of the Palestinians” (by which Palestinians, through their security forces,
have become guardians of their own occupiers). The article reviews the
intensifying demands for democratization that have been emerging in
Palestinian society within the last several years and considers how these
demands have articulated with the uprisings in other Arab countries,
sometimes labeled the “Arab Spring.” The prescriptions that Palestinians
themselves are currently discussing for strengthening their own practice of
democracy include national reconciliation between Fateh and Hamas,
reform of the PLO, and abolition of the PA. All of these prescriptions hold
some promise, particularly as each would help revive political interaction
and discussion among all Palestinians, wherever they are situated. But none
is truly sufficient, and each bears potentially significant costs. One of the
most difficult questions currently facing Palestinians is whether to reorient
their struggle from one aiming to achieve national liberation in an
independent state - the prospects of which seem increasingly dim, in light of
ongoing Israeli colonization of the West Bank - to one seeking equal civil
and political rights in what has emerged as a functionally unitary state in
Israel and the Palestinian territories it occupies. This might require a
fundamental reevaluation of what it means to be “Palestinian,” and the
abandonment of ethno-religious criteria for identity in favor of a new
concept of democratic citizenship.
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INTRODUCTION
The title of this article implies that Palestinian politics 1 have been more
democratic in the past than they are today. That implication is fully
intentional. This paper will argue that Palestinian politics, indeed, have been
more democratic in the past than they are now. In this author’s view,
Palestinian politics reached their democratic zenith in the late 1980’s and
2
Since that time,
early 1990’s, during the first Palestinian intifada.
Palestinian democratic practices have been in gradual, if not precipitous,
decline, so much so that Palestinians today face what might be fairly
characterized as a crisis of representation and accountability. The depth of
Palestinian public dismay with their leaders was palpable in a recent
description by Omar Barghouti, a prominent activist in the Palestinian
movement for boycotts, divestment, and sanctions against Israel, who
referred to Palestinian leadership as “unelected, unrepresentative,
3
unprincipled, and visionless.”
The main objective of this article is to both trace the arc of Palestinian
democracy and try to explain it, while also offering some observations on
how that arc may again be turned upward. It should be immediately clarified,
however, that Palestinian politics have never been fully democratic. On the
contrary, Palestinian democratic practice has fallen short in a number of
4
significant respects—to be explored soon below. It follows from this,
therefore, that for Palestinian politics to be successfully democratized today,
it is not sufficient simply to return to past practices nor to restore preexisting institutions to their previous status. More than that is required.
A disclosure here is necessary: in the view of this author, genuine

1

By “politics” I simply mean the institutions, practices, and norms by which a society or
group of people manages power and authority in public life.
2
“Intifada” is derived from the Arabic verb meaning to “shake off;” it is commonly
translated as “uprising.” The term first began to be widely used in reference to the political
upheaval that swept the Gaza Strip and West Bank beginning in late 1987, aiming to “shake
off” or end Israeli military occupation that persisted for several years before tapering off
inconclusively in 1992. See Mark Tessler, Intifada: 1987-1992, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
PALESTINIANS 182, 182-90 (Philip Mattar ed., 2000). A second Palestinian intifada broke out
in October 2000 that is sometimes identified as the “al-Aqsa intifada” because it followed a
politically provocative visit by Ariel Sharon, campaigning to become prime minister of Israel,
to the “Haram ash-Sharif” or Holy Mount that includes al-Aqsa Mosque. A variety of
perspectives on the second or “al-Aqsa” intifada are offered in THE STRUGGLE FOR
SOVEREIGNTY (Joel Beinin & Rebecca L. Stein eds., 2006).
3
OMAR BARGHOUTI, BDS: BOYCOTT, DIVESTMENT, SANCTIONS 7 (2011).
4
See infra Part II.
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democracy—defined most broadly as any set of institutions, practices, and
norms that enact the people’s will in public policy—is good, for Palestinians
5
and for others. Palestinian leaders should represent and strive to implement
the interests of their people and mechanisms of accountability should exist
and function if and when Palestinian leaders fail in their essential
responsibilities. Needless to say, this is a normative position to which not all
need subscribe. But it is one to which this author subscribes and, moreover,
is a point of departure for this article and therefore will be assumed rather
than defended here.
Notwithstanding the fact that the most progressive and democratic
forces in Palestinian society have historically, been hostile to Israel and its
government’s policies, it is likely that genuine democracy among
Palestinians ultimately will be good for their neighbors, particularly for
6
Israeli Jews.
Unfortunately, there are real and seemingly intractable
differences of interest and aspiration between Palestinian Arabs and Israeli
Jew that must one day be reconciled. There is little to gain, however, in
maintaining a Palestinian leadership that does not honestly, forthrightly, and
firmly articulate its people’s positions on issues of critical concern. The
absence of a truly representative Palestinian leadership simply means that
the difficult challenges in negotiating a fair accommodation with Israeli Jews
will continue unresolved.
The reader will note the stress in the paragraph above on genuine
democracy. I stress the term genuine democracy so as to highlight the
distinction between it and apparent democracy. This distinction seems
necessary because of the occasional tendency in popular thinking to confuse
or mistake the conduct of elections, and the resulting apparent democracy,
for genuine or actual democracy. Elections certainly can and often do
contribute to establishing a democratic system. However, elections can also
be turned to anti-democratic ends, especially through the manipulation of the
franchise. As shall be seen below, this is a particularly salient consideration
7
in recent Palestinian political history.
This article next examines the substantial obstacles to Palestinian

5
There are many definitions of democracy, but at its bare minimum it means “rule of the
people.” How democracy has been realized (or perhaps better, approximated) in various
societies has varied through time and space, whether through direct or representative versions;
my definition hews closely to the basic meaning of “rule of the people.”
6
Moshe Ma’oz, Democratization Among West Bank Palestinians and Palestinian-Israeli
Relations, in DEMOCRACY, PEACE, AND THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT 213, 237-38 (Edy
Kaufman, Shukri B. Abed & Robert R. Rothstein eds., 1993).
7
See infra Part III.
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democratic practice were negotiated and the extent to which they were
overcome. Part II addresses the process of “de-democratization” to which
Palestinian political institutions and practices have been subjected since
1993. In Part III, the article discusses the intensifying demands for
democratization that have been emerging in Palestinian society within the
last several years, and considers how these demands have articulated with
the uprisings in other Arab countries, sometimes labeled the “Arab Spring.”
Part IV reviews and evaluates some of the prescriptions that Palestinians
themselves are currently discussing for strengthening their own practice of
democracy. The final part draws some brief conclusions.
I. THE RISE OF PALESTINIAN DEMOCRATIC PRACTICE
A comprehensive historical survey of the rise of Palestinian democratic
practice is beyond the scope of this article. 8 Instead, the focus of this section
is on two enduring obstacles to the achievement of Palestinian democracy:
geographic dispersion and the fragmentation of Palestinian societies on the
one hand, and external intervention on the other hand. Thereafter, we will
turn to the rise of Palestinian democratic practice in the late 1960’s, in
particular through the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the extent to
which the aforementioned obstacles were overcome.
a. Geographic Dispersion and Fragmentation
In 1948, more than half of all Palestinians—in other words, between
700,000 and 800,000 persons—were either forced from their homes by
Jewish militias or fled in fear in anticipation of the same. Palestinians refer
9
to this event as the “Nakba” or “Catastrophe.” The majority took refuge in
the West Bank or Gaza Strip, although large numbers reached Lebanon,

8

Nor, unfortunately, is there a single source that undertakes this task. Ma’oz, supra note
6, presents a brief sketch of democratic practices among Palestinians from the early twentieth
century until 1993. RASHID KHALIDI, THE IRON CAGE (2006) (providing many great insights
into the political challenges faced by Palestinians, although the author’s preoccupation is the
failure of the Palestinian national movement to achieve statehood, not democracy as such).
9
Three important studies of the Palestinian exodus of this period are NUR MASALHA,
EXPULSION OF THE PALESTINIANS 198 (1992) (placing the number of Palestinian refugees at
“some 750,000”); BENNY MORRIS, THE BIRTH OF THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE PROBLEM
REVISITED 604 (2004) (characterizing 700,000 as a “fair estimate”); and ILAN PAPPE, THE
ETHNIC CLEANSING OF PALESTINE xiii (2006) (placing the number of displaced Palestinians at
“close to 800,000”). Meanwhile the pre-hostilities Arab population of Palestine was 1.25
million. MORRIS, supra, at 7.
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Syria, Jordan, and Egypt. According to Israeli sources, the June 1967 war
caused the flight of between 200,000 and 250,000 Palestinians; some were
refugees from 1948 while others were residents of the West Bank or Gaza
10
Strip, which fell under Israeli rule for the first time. Most 1967 refugees
fled eastward to Jordan. While these two dramatic upheavals were the cause
of flight of most Palestinians from their homes and homeland, many others
have subsequently left due to political repression, land confiscations,
restrictions on movement and economic opportunity, and a variety of other
11
For
Israeli policies that seem calculated to continue the “Nakba.”
example, between 1967 and 1994, the Israeli government denied residency
permits to nearly a quarter of a million Palestinian residents of the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip who had left those territories to go abroad for work,
12
study, or other reasons.
Geographic dispersion and fragmentation has been an obstacle to
democratic development among Palestinians in at least four significant ways.
First, it created distinct living conditions and experiences for differently
situated Palestinian communities. Such communities include minority
citizens of the state of Israel; the descendants of the roughly 140,000
Palestinians who did not flee beyond the areas controlled by Israeli forces in
13
Others include more
the 1948-49 fighting today number 1.623 million.
than four million refugees living in the surrounding Arab countries as well as

10

TOM SEGEV, 1967: ISRAEL, THE WAR, AND THE YEAR THAT TRANSFORMED THE MIDDLE
EAST 410 (Jessica Cohen trans., 2005).
11
See Alan Hart, Never ending Nakba, ALAN HART (May 15, 2012),
http://www.alanhart.net/never-ending-nakba/.
12
Akiva Eldar, Israel admits it revoked residency rights of a quarter million Palestinians,
HAARETZ (June 12, 2012, 1:18 AM), http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/israeladmits-it-revoked-residency-rights-of-a-quarter-million-palestinians-1.435778.
13
See MORRIS, supra note 9, at 603 (discussing Israeli government figures suggesting
102,000 Palestinians remained in areas under Israeli control after 1948 and an additional
30,000-40,000 who, after fleeing, infiltrated back); Moti Bassok, Israel’s population stands at
nearly 8 million on its 64th Independence Day, HAARETZ (Apr. 24, 2012, 11:08 PM),
http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/israel-s-population-stands-at-nearly-8-million-on-its64th-independence-day-1.426381. It should be noted, however, that Israel’s Central Bureau
of Statistics counts the 360,000 Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem as part of Israel’s
population, notwithstanding the fact that few of them have accepted Israeli citizenship. See
Nir Hasson, Report: 78% of East Jerusalem Palestinians live in poverty, HAARETZ (May 20,
2012, 1:08 AM), http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/report-78-of-east-jerusalempalestinians-live-in-poverty-1.431384 (noting the current Palestinian population of East
Jerusalem). The number of Palestinian citizens of Israel, therefore, is between 1.2 and 1.3
million.
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further abroad, 14 and four million residents of the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip, both under Israeli military occupation or control for the last forty-five
15
years.
These differences in daily life experience have, quite naturally,
given rise to somewhat distinct identities that challenge the unity of the
Palestinian people. Needless to say, democracy can only be developed
within a “demos,” or people; when the boundaries of that “people” are
contested, the task is all the more fraught.
Second, geographic dispersion and fragmentation have positioned the
various Palestinian communities to be differentially impacted by different
prospective resolutions of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This is especially
true of the two-state solution that has been formally adopted by the
international community as its preferred model for resolution of the conflict
16
The Palestinian
in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1515.
community with the most to gain by that resolution’s passing would be those
currently suffering under Israeli military occupation in the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip, who would achieve at least nominal sovereignty and greater
freedom over their lives. Palestinian citizens of Israel, however, would

14

Exact figures on the numbers of Palestinian refugees living outside the borders of former
Mandate Palestine are not easy to find. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency places
the number of formally registered Palestinians in its camps in Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon, at
nearly 3 million, while those residing in the West Bank and Gaza Strip together just exceed 2
million. U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, UNRWA
Statistics-2010 5 (Nov. 2011), http://www.unrwa.org/userfiles/2011120434013.pdf. This
does not count Palestinians who were refugees but did not register as such with UNRWA, nor
does it include Palestinian refugees living in other countries, such as Iraq or Egypt, or Europe
and the Americas. Badil, the Bethlehem-based Resource Center for Residency and Refugee
Rights, estimated the total number of Palestinian refugees at 6.6 million in its 2008-2009
survey. Survey of Palestinian Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons 2008-2009, BADIL
(BADIL,
Palestine,
Bethlehem),
at
ix,
available
at
http://www.badil.org/en/publications?page=shop.product_details&flypage=garden_flypage.tp
l&product_id=119&category_id=7. Assuming these figures are accurate, this means there are
approximately 1.6 million unregistered Palestinian refugees, distributed between the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip and those outside the borders of former Mandate Palestine. It seems
likely that the majority of these are outside, thus the estimate of “greater than four million.”
15
The CIA world fact book estimates the total West Bank population as of July 2012 as
just over 2.6 million, of who just over 300,000 are Israeli Jewish settlers. WORLD FACTBOOK:
WEST BANK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/we.html (last
updated Feb. 6, 2013) (click on “People and Society” tab). The same source, meanwhile,
estimates the July 2012 population of the Gaza Strip at just over 1.7 million. WORLD
FACTBOOK: GAZA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gz.html
(last updated Feb. 5, 2013) (click on “People and Society” tab).
16
See S.C. Res. 1515, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1515 (Nov. 19, 2003).
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witness their subordinate status in Israeli society consecrated and
perpetuated, especially if Israel’s status as a “Jewish state” is formally
recognized in a peace agreement. Meanwhile, Palestinian refugees living in
exile would benefit from a two-state solution only to the extent that they
receive the rights to return to their homes and homeland and to receive
compensation for their losses. As many Palestinian refugees fled from areas
that will remain within Israel under a two-state solution, their rights of return
17
will be only imperfectly realized. Fragmentation, therefore, has introduced
deep differences of interests among different segments of the Palestinian
people.
Minor internal differences are not fatal to democratic development.
Indeed, all democratic societies live with them. Deep schisms, however, are
difficult to resolve via democratic means. It is particularly challenging to
resolve deep differences in the absence of opportunities for national
dialogue. This is the third respect in which geographic dispersion and
fragmentation have inhibited Palestinian democratic development: by
frustrating, to the point of impossibility, a coherent and consistent national
dialogue that encompasses all three major segments of the Palestinian people
(citizens of Israel, residents of the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip, and
refugees living in exile). Travel restrictions and other limitations on
communication have virtually barred Palestinians from conducting the
debate necessary to democratic decision-making regarding their respective
futures.
Finally, geographic dispersion and fragmentation established what were
essentially Palestinian hostage communities that gave a particularly vital
form of leverage to surrounding Arab regimes. Regimes that hosted
Palestinian populations could, by implicit threat if not explicit action, exert
pressure on Palestinian leaders and force them to answer not only to the
needs of the Palestinian people, but also to the preferences of those regimes.
b. External Intervention
The key reality to highlight here is that Palestinians have never had the
space—that is to say, their own state—within which to elaborate democratic
17

These rights were first recognized by the international community in United Nations
General Assembly Resolution 194 of 1949. G.A. Res. 194 (III), ¶ 11, U.N. Doc A/RES/194
(III) (Dec. 11, 1948). The author provides a fuller exploration of the differential impact of a
two-state solution on differently situated Palestinian communities in George E. Bisharat,
Maximizing Rights: The One-State Solution to the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict, 8 GLOBAL
JURIST,
Issue
2,
art.
1,
2008,
available
at
http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/gj.2008.8.2/gj.2008.8.2.1266/gj.2008.8.2.1266.xml.
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practices. While no political entity is entirely impervious to external
influences, state borders erect a permeable barrier to such influences. This
in turn enables a sovereign people to experiment with, gain experience in,
and institutionalize democracy. In short, geographic borders frame the
political space for democratic development and, in the view of some
18
analysts, are vital to democratic development. That claim may go too far;
that is, it is theoretically possible to imagine the emergence of democratic
practices at the sub-state and supra-state levels. Indeed, such emergence is
empirically observable in the case of the Palestinians in local level
organizing and political organizations (such as the Palestine Liberation
Organization, and a number of its constituent organizations) that have
spanned across state borders. But there is little question that the absence of
the protective shield of a state has rendered the Palestinians persistently
vulnerable to other state authorities that have not hesitated to intervene in
Palestinian affairs, often to radical effect.
This intervention has assumed two broad forms: (1) repression,
including limitations on movement, free expression, free association,
imprisonments, banishments, and ultimately, assassinations of Palestinian
political leaders and (2) co-optation, meaning the provision of positive
emoluments including tangible assets (money), access to power or office,
business licenses, and the like. The mix of these two broad forms of
intervention—repression and co-optation—has varied over time and space,
but a high level of outside intervention has been a constant feature of
Palestinian political life.
Outside intervention in Palestinian political life has had anti-democratic
effects for two main reasons. First, repression has often forced Palestinian
politics underground; and secrecy and democracy, while not directly at odds,
are certainly not easily reconciled. Second, Palestinians’ aspirations for
freedom and independence in their homeland has been consistently opposed
by a series of powerful outside parties, who have intervened to install or
support Palestinian leaders who were compliant to their wishes, not the
wishes of the Palestinian people.
This was true, for example, of the British Mandate that ruled Palestine
from 1923 to 1948, in which ruling authority was exercised by a British

18

In the view of some political scientists, state borders are a necessary but not sufficient
condition for the establishment of a democratic system—the other condition being a balance
of power between internal social forces that bars domination and the imposition of the will of
some over others. See generally LEV LUIS GRINBERG, POLITICS AND VIOLENCE IN
ISRAEL/PALESTINE (2010).

10

17 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOR. AFF. 1 (2013)

High Commissioner appointed from London. Palestinian demands for
democratic government during the Mandate period— one that would defend
the interests of Palestinian Arabs, who were a majority of the population of
19
Instead, a
the state—were consistently spurned by their British rulers.
Legislative Council was formed that joint-appointed British colonial officers
with elected Palestinian and Jewish members. Together the British
appointees and Jewish members outnumbered the Palestinian members,
despite the fact that Palestinians were 90% of the population at the beginning
of the Mandate, and still 65% at the end of the Mandate after massive Jewish
20
The British, of course, were compelled to deny the
immigration.
Palestinian drive for democratic government because the overwhelming
majority of Palestinians staunchly opposed one of the prime objectives of the
Mandate, to establish a Jewish national home in Palestine. Virtually every
powerful actor since then, including Israel, the Arab countries, and the
United States, has similarly intervened to foil Palestinian democratic
aspirations; not out of any hostility to democracy itself, but because of fear
and hostility to the predicted outcome of democratic processes among
Palestinians.
c. The Rise of Palestinian Democratic Practice
Despite these two formidable and enduring obstacles—geographic
dispersion and external intervention—real progress began towards
Palestinian democracy began with the takeover of the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO). The PLO, it will be recalled, was created by the Arab
states in 1964 precisely as an instrument of co-optation and control of the
Palestinian national movement. It was headed by individuals appointed by
21
Fateh, the Palestinian guerrilla organization that was
the Arab League.
founded in 1959 and had launched its first military operation against Israel in
22
The takeover was consummated
January 1965, engineered the takeover.
by the election of Yasser Arafat as Chair of the Executive Committee of the
PLO at the fifth meeting of the Palestine National Council in 1969. Fateh
faced a strategic decision at the time whether or not to monopolize the
resources of the PLO. Under the leadership of Yasser Arafat and others,

19

KHALIDI, supra note 8, at 33-36.
See VICTOR KATTAN, FROM COEXISTENCE TO CONQUEST 62-63 (2009).
21
See HILLEL FRISCH, COUNTDOWN TO STATEHOOD 17 (1998); JOOST R. HILTERMANN,
BEHIND THE INTIFADA 38 (1991).
22
The campaign by Fateh to take control of the organization is described in detail in
HELENA COBBAN, THE PALESTINIAN LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (1984).
20
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Fateh opted for the principle of political pluralism—that is, fostering
23
representation of other Palestinian political parties and resistance groups.
The Palestine National Council (PNC), the supreme policy-making body of
the organization under the PLO’s Constitution, became a forum for vibrant,
open, and democratic debate of the direction of the Palestinian national
24
The PLO encompassed not just resistance organizations, but
movement.
also a variety of unions—of Palestinian workers, women, students,
engineers, writers, and others—achieving very high levels of popular
25
mobilization. In what ways did all this fall short of democratic practice?
First, despite a clause in the PLO Charter requiring direct elections to the
PNC, such elections never took place. Instead, PNC members were
nominated according to a quota system negotiated among leaders of the
various Palestinian political organizations. Nominated members were then
confirmed by a vote of currently sitting PNC members. This provided a
veneer of democracy to what was functionally a top-down selection
26
This pattern of elections that served to ordain outcomes
process.
orchestrated in advance by political elites has been characteristic of
27
Palestinian politics in a number of other contexts as well. Second, while
lateral political pluralism prevailed among organizations under the PLO
umbrella, the internal administration of Palestinian political groups was not
terribly democratic. For some Palestinian groups, this was a legacy of their
military natures. Meanwhile, Palestinian leftist organizations, such as the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), had been steeped in the
28
Leninist vision of democratic centralism. In either case, it was top-down
management by the Palestinian political class that prevailed more often than
bottom-up leadership from grassroots activists and local level leaders.
Another significant flaw in Palestinian democracy was the fact that the
PNC and the PLO disproportionately represented the Palestinian diaspora at
23
The reasons for this choice are discussed in ALAIN GRESH, THE PLO: THE STRUGGLE
WITHIN 11-14 (A.M. Berrett trans., 1983). Chief among them, however, was the desire for
unity as a means to foil the interference of Arab states in Palestinian affairs.
24
See GRESH, supra note 23.
25
COBBAN, supra note 22, at 13 (providing an organization chart of the PLO).
26
Id. at 11.
27
For example, this pattern can be seen in the internal leadership selection processes of the
main Palestinian political and guerrilla organizations. HILTERMANN, supra note 21, at 14.
28
Both the PFLP and DFLP were outgrowths of the Arab Nationalist Movement, which
Yezid Sayigh describes as mirroring the “classic pyramid of communist parties.” YEZID
SAYIGH, ARMED STRUGGLE AND THE SEARCH FOR STATE 73-74 (1997).
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the expense of Palestinian citizens of Israel and those living under Israeli
military occupation in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This was due to a
variety of factors, perhaps chief among them the preeminence of the PLO
and its constituent organizations “that matured in the diaspora and whose
29
Meanwhile,
program and ideology reflected that of the diaspora.”
Palestinians living within Israel or in the territories it occupied in 1967 were
inhibited, barred from participation in national politics by the prospect of
30
Finally, the
arrest, deportation, or other sanction by Israeli authorities.
PLO tacitly abandoned the task of representing the concerns of the
Palestinian citizens of Israel as an outgrowth of its mid-seventies strategic
shift away from the goal of a democratic secular state in all of former
Mandate Palestine in favor of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the
31
Gaza Strip only. Whatever these democratic shortcomings, Palestinians
tended to chalk them up to the hostile environments they faced. As long as
the PLO leadership was pursuing policies supported by a broad national
consensus, conditions seemed adequately, if not perfectly, democratic. The
most significant rupture in the overall pattern described above occurred
during the first Intifada, which erupted in late 1987 before waning in the
early 1990s.
This was the Palestinian people’s most democratic
movement—a true upswelling of grassroots sentiment and activism that
momentarily shifted the political initiative out of the hands of diaspora elders
and political fixers and into the hands of a youthful decentralized leadership
in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The Intifada was managed on a dayto-day basis by a “Unified National Leadership of the Uprising.” Its rotating
32
membership both practiced and preached respect for democracy. This
period was characterized by the invigoration of civil society thanks to a host

29

HILTERMANN, supra note 21, at 5.
Under Israeli military orders long in force in the West Bank, mere membership in an
organization whose other members commit an offense, such as possession of a firearm, is
punishable by life imprisonment. Order Regarding Security Provisions [Consolidated
Version] (Judea and Samaria) (No. 1651) 5770-2009, Article 231, available at
http://nolegalfrontiers.org/en/military-orders/mil01/69-security-provisions-chapter6-209-262
(military order 1651 consolidates several military orders from 1967-1970 among others). A
few Palestinian citizens of Israel gained prominence in the PLO, such as lawyer Sabri Jiryis
and poet Mahmoud Darwish, but only by emigrating from Israel and accepting permanent
exile from their homeland. Others achieved positions in the PLO following deportation by
Israeli authorities. See COBBAN, supra note 22, at 171.
31
See generally GRESH, supra note 23 (providing reasons for and debates surrounding this
shift).
32
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of new non-governmental organizations (NGOs)—human rights groups,
women’s groups, medical societies, and the like—that mobilized broad
segments of Palestinian society in largely non-violent resistance to Israeli
33
occupation. In the words of political scientist Glenn Robinson:
This new elite mobilized a transformed society in order to better
confront the occupation. By so doing, authority was pushed
downward in a society away from the notable elite and toward a
much broader spectrum of individuals. The devolution of authority
was seen directly in the Intifada by the emergence of thousands of
popular institutions which organized Palestinian society under
emergency conditions and which Israel found to be impossible to
eliminate. Sustained collective action, then, was directly linked to
the reorganization of authority in Palestinian society by the
34
mobilization efforts of the new elite.

The first Intifada also witnessed a visible increase in the public political role
of Palestinian women. And while the Intifada by no means permanently
altered the patriarchal structure of Palestinian society, “women made
important progress in raising consciousness of their rights in society, and
more women were mobilized than ever before in organizational structures
that channeled their energies toward satisfying, beyond demonstrations, the
35
needs of a society under siege.” Against these positive, democratizing
trends that characterized the first Intifada, however, we must note other
troubling developments. First, this was also the era in which Palestinian
Islamist organizations such as Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas rose to
36
To be clear, these organizations were not inherently antiprominence.
democratic. Indeed, there is good evidence that Hamas, at least, has
conducted its internal affairs in a far more democratic and disciplined
37
manner than any of the secular nationalist Palestinian organizations.
However, Hamas and other religiously-inspired Palestinian groups still
raised the difficult and as yet unresolved issue of whether and how to
integrate divergent Palestinian outlooks into a single national representative
body. Second, the Intifada was never simply a spontaneous outburst of
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Palestinian popular resentment against Israeli occupation giving rise to
wholly new and independent political forces. It was always simultaneously
structured and guided by pre-existing Palestinian political groups; the
Unified National Leadership of the Uprising, for example, consistently
38
consulted the PLO leadership, then based in Tunis, on its proposed actions.
In any case, the old guard soon reasserted its hegemony over the Palestinian
national movement, riding the wave of popular revolt into the Madrid peace
talks in 1991, and as the Palestinian public was later to learn, the secret
negotiations leading to the Oslo accords in 1993. This, in a sense, was the
beginning of the process of “de-democratization” of Palestinian politics that
is the topic of the next part.
II. THE DE-DEMOCRATIZATION OF PALESTINIAN POLITICS
There are a variety of ways to frame the development of Palestinian
39
politicsin the era that began with the signing of the Oslo accords on the
White House lawn in September 1993 and continues to the present. In the
opinion of this author, the period may be best characterized by two
processes: the “downsizing of Palestine,” and the “domestication of the
Palestinians.”
a. Downsizing Palestine
Downsizing Palestine as used in this article refers to the conceptual and
administrative reduction of “Palestine” to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip,
or to whatever remnants of those regions remain under effective Palestinian
control. Among Palestinians themselves, as well as among supporters of
Palestinian national rights, the most common meaning of “Palestine” was
traditionally the territory of former Mandate Palestine, which was viewed as
the historic homeland of the Palestinian people. Using the term “Palestine”
in the aftermath of the founding of Israel in 1948 involved a symbolic denial
of the legitimacy of Israel’s existence, and a normative assertion of the
continuity of Palestine’s existence despite its actual demise as a political
entity. Prior to 2002, Israeli leaders, and their supporters, including U.S.
politicians, rarely if ever used the term.
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The rhetorical or conceptual shift toward a reduced meaning for
“Palestine” is mostly a feature of Western political and media discourse, and
has unfolded gradually over the last two decades— although a decisive turn
occurred in 2002 when U.S. President George W. Bush formally adopted
support for the establishment of a Palestinian state as a key element of U.S.
foreign policy toward the Middle East. 40 One notable public marker of the
shift was Vice President Cheney’s repeated references to “Palestine” in his
October 5, 2004, debate with John Edwards during the run-up to U.S.
national elections. 41 While the exact meaning of his reference cannot be
firmly established, surely he did not intend the expansive meaning of
“Palestine” used by Palestinians. His invoking the term as if “Palestine” was
a present-tense reality strongly suggests that what he intended was the
governing structures that had emerged as a consequence of the Oslo accords.
Other indications of the shift to a diminished meaning of “Palestine” are
evident in common English-language media references to “Palestine,”42 or
to Mahmoud Abbas as the “Palestinian president” (when he is, in fact,
president of the Palestinian Authority, elected solely by the Palestinian
residents of the Occupied Territories), 43 and in polling data that purports to
represent what “Palestinians” believe—data that are almost inevitably culled
solely from residents of the West Bank or Gaza Strip.44 The usage of a
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diminished “Palestine” has also crept into some academic discourse on the
region. 45
It should be noted, however, that Palestinian leaders and officials may
have unwittingly participated in producing this new meaning for “Palestine,”
for it is not uncommon for them, too, to refer to “Palestine” as if it were an
existing entity. 46 Undoubtedly it is their intention in using this term to
normalize the concept of “Palestine” as a concrete reality, and thereby to
gain acceptance for recognition of Palestine as a full-fledged state—almost
as if that state could be spoken into existence. We can think of this, perhaps,
as Palestine in an “aspirational” sense. But if that is what Palestinian leaders
intend, it seems equally likely that unsympathetic others may instead take
away an entirely different and empirical meaning: if “Palestine” exists today,
then that term can only refer to the sub-state entity that currently operates in
the West Bank and that exercises minimal and ambiguous authority over just
parts of the West Bank. Following the 2007 split in authority between
Fateh, which controls the West Bank, and Hamas, which governs the Gaza
Strip, it is no longer even self-evident that the Gaza Strip belongs to this
“Palestine.” If this is correct, Palestinian leaders themselves could be
helping to pave the way for broad international acceptance of a vastly
downsized “Palestine”—downsized geographically and downsized in
governing authority from the robust sovereignty that is exercised by
genuinely independent states.
The administrative aspect of “downsizing” involves the progressive
eclipse of the PLO by the Palestinian Authority (PA). The PA was
established via the Oslo Accords and was originally intended to serve as an
interim self-governing authority for the Palestinians while “final status”
issues (borders, settlements, Jerusalem, refugees, security) were negotiated.
Elections for a PA chief and for eighty-eight members of a new Palestinian
Legislative Council (PLC) were held in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in
January 1996, purportedly for four-year terms. 47 In the early years of the
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See, e.g., Scott Lasensky, Chequebook Diplomacy: The US, the Oslo Process and the
Role of Foreign Aid, in AID, DIPLOMACY AND FACTS ON THE GROUND: THE CASE OF PALESTINE
41 (Michael Keating, Anne Le More & Robert Lowe eds., 2005) (“As part of this new push
for peace, the US is injecting additional economic assistance into Palestine, already one of the
world’s highest per capita recipients of international aid.”). It is, of course, the PA that is the
recipient of this aid, not “Palestine” as a whole.
46
Saeb Erekat, U.S. Elections: Palestine Can’t Wait, HAARETZ (Nov. 5, 2012, 2:01 PM),
http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/u-s-elections-palestine-can-t-wait-1.475330 (PLO Executive
Member and chief Palestinian negotiator referencing “Palestine” as if it were an existing
entity).
47
The membership of the PLC was increased in 2005 to 132. AARON D. PINA, CONG.

Re-Democratizing Palestinian Politics

17

PA, the PLC developed into a dynamic organization and became the
repository for Palestinian democratic hopes. Moreover, it was the main
bastion against the emerging authoritarian tendencies of the Palestinian
leadership, personified in Yasser Arafat. 48 But even under the best of
circumstances, the PA, while sporting some of the trappings of democracy,
functionally disenfranchised a majority of the Palestinian people who were
not residents of the West Bank or Gaza Strip and therefore did not
participate in PA elections.
Meanwhile the institutions of the PLO, long recognized internationally
as the official representative of the entire Palestinian people, fell into disuse
and atrophy. For example, after the birth of the PA, the PNC, which had met
an average of once a year for its first two decades, met only in 1996, 1998,
and then in 2009. 49 The de-democratizing aspect of these developments is
thus characterized by the elevation of a body representing a part of the
Palestinian people over one representing the whole.
b. Domesticating the Palestinians
The “domestication” of a people is an inherently demeaning concept.
Domestication of animals, for example, typically involves penning them,
feeding them, and reducing them to dependency on humans. Yet that is,
with scarce exaggeration, what the Palestinians of the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip have been subjected to over the last decade.
The “penning” of the Palestinians has been accomplished by smothering
restrictions on the freedom of movement imposed by the Israeli military.
Travel between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip has been almost
completely barred, as has travel into East Jerusalem from the West Bank.
Israel’s separation wall, road system, and associated administrative regime
divide the West Bank into a series of geographically discontiguous cantons,
or perhaps more accurately, bantustans.
The “feeding” of the Palestinians and their reduction to dependency is
manifest in massive infusions of foreign aid to the PA. Some $7.5 billion
was transferred to the PA from 2008-2010 alone, much of it from the United

RESEARCH SERV., RL33269, PALESTINIAN ELECTIONS 9 (2006).
48
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States and the European Union but from other sources as well.50 This aid
has had a variety of adverse and anti-democratic effects.
To put it bluntly, though hopefully not simplistically, massive aid
rendered the PA more answerable to donors than to the Palestinian public it
allegedly served. Perhaps the most vivid demonstration of this fact is in the
establishment of security forces—that Palestinians refer to as “Drayton’s
brigades” for their trainer and organizer, U.S. General Keith Drayton—
whose performance is measured by how well they defend not Palestinians,
but Israelis. The Israelis in question, meanwhile, are not simply those living
peacefully in Tel Aviv but include the soldiers and civilian settlers who are
engaged in the continuing illegal settlement of the West Bank. One would
have to search hard in history to find another example of an occupied people
that is charged with the responsibility of guaranteeing the security of its
occupiers.
Foreign aid also enabled the outside Palestinian leadership, returning to
the Occupied Palestinian Territories in the mid-1990’s, to secure their
political standing via patronage, rather than in earning legitimacy by
actualizing Palestinian public aspirations and interests.
This was
accomplished mainly by providing employment in the PA, leading to a
bloated bureaucracy of some 140,000 employees. 51
A parallel development occurred as well at the level of civil society.
NGOs that had played such a vital role during the First Intifada, or those
founded after the Olso accords, similarly went on the foreign aid dole, giving
rise to a new highly-paid “NGO aristocracy.” Like the PA itself, these
NGOs seemed to many Palestinians to be “cut off from the grassroots and
democratic structures that existed to represent the plurality of views in
Palestinian civil society.” 52
Much more could be written to elaborate on this period, but to
summarize in the interest of brevity, this was an era of massive external
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intervention in Palestinian political affairs that had mostly anti-democratic
effects. It would be wrong, however, to claim that the downward turn in the
arc of Palestinian democratic practice during this period were solely due to
external influence. On the contrary, many Palestinians were active partners
in this sordid venture. Both Palestinian governments, in the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip, have imprisoned and tortured political opponents,53 trampled
press freedoms, 54 appropriated the resources of the Palestinian people for
partisan or party gain, and have otherwise acted like petty tyrants. There is,
unfortunately, plenty of blame to be shared.
III. PALESTINIAN DEMOCRACY AND THE ARAB UPRISINGS
The so-called “Arab Spring” had effects on the movement for
democracy among Palestinians at both intangible and tangible levels. At the
intangible level, the uprisings in Tunis and Cairo served to remind
Palestinians of the power of non-violent grassroots activism, and offered an
inspiring model for resistance to oppression by Arab youths equipped with
the new tools of social media. The impending changes in neighboring Arab
countries also boosted morale among Palestinians by promising to usher in
Arab governments whose policies would more consistently reflect their
peoples’ palpable sympathy for the Palestinian cause. For Palestinians both
young and old, however, the uprisings in surrounding countries against
indigenous autocracies raised additional complex questions: who would be
the target of a new Palestinian uprising?
Their own “unelected,
55
unrepresentative, unprincipled, and visionless” leaders or Israel, the most
persistent and violent denier of their freedoms?
In fact, disillusionment if not disgust among Palestinian youths with
their official leaders was manifest even before the outbreak of the so-called
“Arab Spring.” A Facebook post by eight young men and women calling
themselves “Gaza Youth Breaks Out” (GYBO) in late 2010 began strikingly
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with an expletive-laced condemnation of both major Palestinian parties,
Fateh and Hamas, along with Israel, the U.S., and the international
community for their neglect of the aspirations of young Palestinians for
basic freedoms. 56 The post created a firestorm of controversy, but seemed to
open the floodgates of internal criticism within Palestinian society. One of
the prominent grievances was the continuing split within the Palestinian
movement between Hamas and Fateh, groups that since a violent rift in
2007, had ruled in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank respectively. As one of
the GYBO members stated: “Politics is bollocks, it is screwing our lives up.
Politicians only care about money and their supporters. The Israelis are the
only ones benefiting from the division.” 57
“National reconciliation” between Fateh and Hamas was a central
demand of the “15 March Movement,” the first visible response to the events
in Tunis and Cairo to be reflected in the Palestinian territories. The shortlived “movement” was formed by a loosely coordinated group of Palestinian
young men and women who were not affiliated with established Palestinian
political parties. They called for mass demonstrations on March 15, 2011, in
both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, adding a call of direct elections to
the Palestine National Council to their demands. 58 The demonstrations,
ultimately, were sparsely attended, and were infiltrated by Fateh activists in
Ramallah and Hamas activists in Gaza City, each seeking to co-opt the
movement. Moreover, in Gaza City some demonstrators were beaten by
Hamas sympathizers. 59
Despite the relatively modest showings by the March 15 Movement, it is
clear that Palestinian officialdom in the West Bank and Gaza Strip took note
of the challenges to their authority and reacted accordingly. National
reconciliation talks between Fateh and Hamas were quickly revived, leading
to the signing of a new unity agreement on May 11, 2011. New elections to
the PLC were promised. Palestinian negotiators stiffened their spines in

56

The text of the “Gaza Youth Manifesto” is viewable at Gaza Youth Manifesto, GAZA
YOUTH BREAKS OUT, http://gazaybo.wordpress.com/manifesto-0-1/ (last visited Feb. 26,
2013).
57
Ana Carbajosa, Gazan Youth Issue Manifesto to Vent Their Anger with All Sides in
the Conflict, GUARDIAN (Jan. 1, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/02/freegaza-youth-manifesto-palestinian.
58
A full list of 15 March Movement demands may be viewed at The Demands of the
#Mar15 Movement Youth of Palestine, OCCUPIED PALESTINE (Mar. 19, 2011),
http://occupiedpalestine.wordpress.com/2011/03/19/the-demands-of-the-mar15-movementyouth-of-palestine/.
59
Karl Vick, On the Run, the Palestinian Youth Movement May Yet Get Its Way, TIME
(Mar. 27, 2011), http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2061661,00.html.

Re-Democratizing Palestinian Politics

21

discussions with Israel, insisting, in particular, on a freeze in Israeli
settlement activity as a condition for resuming broader peace negotiations.
The PLO’s Fall 2011 campaign for upgraded status in the United Nations
may also have been stimulated in part by the leadership’s need to
demonstrate initiative in the face of stagnation in the two decade long “peace
process.”
While the March 15 Movement later dissipated without apparent lasting
impact, other similar groups have proved somewhat more durable. Hirak alShababi al-Mustaqil, the “Independent Youth Movement” (IYM), has
continued to organize protests and other events. On May 15, 2012, for
example, IYM contributed to organizing a march to Ofer military prison in
the West Bank, highlighting the concerns of Palestinian political prisoners
facing administrative detention and other forms of long-term incarceration
without trial.60
The regional political changes wrought by the Arab uprisings have also
exercised more tangible effects on Palestinian politics as well. Civil unrest
in Syria, for example, led to Hamas’s external wing’s evacuation from
Damascus to Cairo by February 2012. More importantly, however, are the
tangible changes that have occurred along the border between the Gaza Strip
and Egypt. Prior to the fall of the Mubarak regime, Egypt had mostly
cooperated in Israel’s siege of the Gaza Strip by keeping its border with that
region tightly restricted, if not closed. Partly due to the chaos that has
reigned in the Sinai Peninsula after Mubarak’s fall, and partly due to the
deliberate policy of the interim Egyptian government to ease travel and trade
restrictions across the Gaza border, traffic of both people and goods has now
soared. Building materials formerly banned by Israel are pouring into the
Gaza Strip, leading to a 220% increase in housing starts. Gaza officials have
accordingly reduced time estimates for repairing the damage to housing
caused by Israel’s 2008-2009 Operation Cast Lead from eight decades to as
little as five years. 61
Not surprisingly, the economic boom in the Gaza Strip is contributing
considerably to the revival of the political fortunes of Hamas, which
arguably has demonstrated that steadfastness in the face of sanctions can be
a viable strategy. This, in turn, may point a way forward for the Palestinians
as a whole, and create pressure on the Palestinian leadership to adopt
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strategies that more accurately reflect the interests and demands of their
people.
Yet just as the apparent gains of the Arab uprisings have been
ephemeral, so too is the ultimate impact of those uprisings on the direction
of Palestinian efforts to achieve democracy.
As one Palestinian
commentator was moved to observe: “the Palestinian people living in their
occupied homeland have remained quiescent. Neither have mass protests
targeted the Palestinian ‘regime’s’ policies or negotiating performance, nor
has resistance to Israeli occupation escalated or taken more effective
forms.” 62 For many Palestinians, the scenes of unarmed Arab civilians
facing armed state authority were highly reminiscent of their own first
Intifada, a comparison that was implicitly referenced in the description of
the multiple uprisings as “intifadat” (plural of intifada). While Palestinians
may have experienced pride in knowing that they had, with their first
Intifada, led the way for other Arabs by more than two decades later, the
successes of their neighbors must also have acted as poignant reminders of
how far the Palestinians had fallen short in their ultimate aims of freedom
and independence.
IV. PRESCRIPTIONS FOR DEMOCRATIC REFORM
In this part we will consider the major prescriptions that Palestinians
themselves have propounded for democratic reform: national reconciliation,
rolling back of the Oslo Accords, and reforming the PLO. None of these
prescriptions are straightforward, easy to achieve, or without risks or costs.
a. National Reconciliation
National reconciliation, meaning a healing of the rift between Fateh and
Hamas and the restoration of political unity, is the first demand of almost all
those who seek reform of the Palestinian movement. Like the GYBO
member quoted above, virtually all Palestinians recognize that division has
hurt their political interests. National unity, moreover, may be a necessary
condition for Palestinians to effectively field a strategy of non-violence. As
political scientist Wendy Pearlman argues, only cohesive movements for
self-determination can enforce discipline among followers and achieve the
levels of mass mobilization necessary for effective non-violence. 63
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It is fair to view national reconciliation as a form of democratization; it
would bring all Palestinian politics into one forum and would force open
debate over the direction of the national movement. But insofar as it would
reinstate the former hegemony of the Palestinian political class without
challenging its top-down style of management, national reconciliation is
necessary but not sufficient to foster true democratization. Moreover,
discussions of national reconciliation do not typically address how the
political parties would engage with the vibrant movement that has emerged
since 2005 in Palestinian civil society in support of boycotts, divestment,
and sanctions. 64
Finally, it is almost certain that national reconciliation between Fateh
and Hamas would lead Israel to suspend all efforts to resume negotiations
with the Palestinians. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has
repeatedly warned PA President Mahmoud Abbas that “[i]t’s either a pact
with Hamas, or peace with Israel . . . you can’t have them both.”65
Furthermore, the U.S., like Israel, considers Hamas a “terrorist
organization,” and is likely to suspend aid to the PA should reconciliation
lead to the appointment of Hamas members to senior PA posts.66 How great
a loss these developments would cause Palestinians is questionable:
negotiations over more than two decades seem only to have provided Israel a
screen behind which to continue its inexorable colonization of the West
Bank, and U.S. aid has come at great expense to Palestinian political
independence and freedom of operation.
b. Rolling Back the Oslo Accords
Rolling back the Oslo Accords could potentially involve a variety of
measures, from ending security cooperation with Israel to abolishing the PA
altogether. In Palestinian discussions regarding these possibilities, the
measures are not generally conceptualized as means of democratization, but
rather as a way to throw back the administrative costs of military occupation
of the West Bank on Israel. To the extent that the PA has supplanted the
PLO and functionally disenfranchised Palestinian citizens of Israel and
Palestinian refugees, the abolition of the PA might begin to restore the PLO
MOVEMENT, (2011).
64
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to its former centrality in Palestinian political life and bring with it a more
frank and fulsome consideration of the interests of the Palestinian people as
a whole.
Yet this option is fraught with concern as well. The welfare of the
140,000 PA employees and their families must be considered, not to mention
the legal implications of what would seem to be a clear breach of the Oslo
Accords. Nonetheless, it is an option that appeals to many Palestinians,
including popular leaders such as Marwan Barghouti. Such an option
deserves further study and discussion.67
c. Reforming the PLO
Reform of the PLO has been a subject of discussion among Palestinian
intellectuals and activists for much of the last decade. The two major
contemplated reforms are the inclusion of Palestinian Islamist parties under
the PLO rubric and direct elections for the PNC. The first, obviously, is a
variation on the theme of national reconciliation and thus requires no further
discussion here.
Direct elections to the PNC are, as previously noted, stipulated in the
charter of the PLO and are difficult if not impossible to oppose in principle.
Indeed, the ostensible reason for the resort to other means of selection for
PNC membership was purely practical: given the geographic dispersion of
the Palestinian people in 1948, it has simply never been possible to organize
elections in which all Palestinians could vote.
Yet with the advent of new technology, the practical obstacles to direct
Palestinian elections are becoming less formidable. That is the apparent
logic behind a current web-based voter registration drive spearheaded by
Palestinian diaspora activists dubbed “Palestinians Register.”68 The drive
was publicly announced on November 11, 2011, and an online registration
period was to commence in May 2012 and close in October 2012. As of
now the campaign only seeks voter registration, and the campaign would end
once the registry is complete. It seems evident that the ultimate aim of the
organizers is to see that democratic elections actually occur. By assembling
the necessary voting data, the organizers are seemingly depriving the current
Palestinian leadership of any pretext for not conducting elections; they are
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thus creating moral pressure on them to follow through on previous promises
to do so. 69
One challenging issue that the campaign for direct PNC elections must
face is the potential participation of Palestinian citizens of Israel, either as
voters or as candidates for PNC membership. Prominent Israeli politicians,
such as former foreign minister Tzipi Livni, have stated that Palestinian
citizens of Israel should seek the fulfillment of their national aspirations in a
Palestinian state. 70 At least some saw in this the hint that Palestinian
citizens of Israel might face possible demotion to something like non-voting
permanent residents. Current Israeli foreign minister Avigdor Lieberman
has also proposed that Palestinian citizens of Israel be required to sign a
loyalty oath to Israel, including avowal of it as a “Jewish and democratic
state.” 71 The question, then, for proponents of the participation of
Palestinian citizens in PNC elections is: how would Israel’s politicians likely
respond were Palestinian citizens of the state to avow affiliation to the PLO?
Would this give right wing Israeli politicians the impetus they need to
demote Palestinian citizens of Israel to non-voting status? The answer is not
clear, but the danger may be averted by a commitment on the part of the
PLO to assume a more active role in advocating the rights and interests of
Palestinian citizens of Israel—a role long since abdicated—while not
requiring their formal institutional affiliation with the PLO.
In light of current political challenges, another significant question
concerns what further reforms to the PLO are due. In particular, once the
reality sinks in more broadly that the two-state solution is not around the
corner, as it has appeared for the last two decades, and that the Israeli
colonizing juggernaut in the West Bank has not lost and will not lose any
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momentum, what direction should the Palestinian national movement take?
Will Palestinians shift, as former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert put it,
from an “Algerian paradigm” of struggle to a “South African one”?72 And if
73
it does, how must an organization cast in the Algerian model adapt? That
is one of the most salient questions facing the Palestinian people today.
CONCLUSION
In view of what has transpired since early 2011 in the surrounding Arab
countries, and considering the histories of their own uprisings against Israeli
military occupation, must the quest of Palestinians for democratization be
advanced through another, third Intifada? There is no clear response to this
question. At the time of this writing, the progress of the various Arab
uprisings in achieving democratic change is decidedly mixed. And if it is
true that Palestinian democratic practice reached a peak in the first Intifada,
the same cannot be said for the second or “Al-Aqsa Intifada” that broke out
in October 2000 and extended into 2005-2006. 74 Certainly, the causes and
surrounding circumstances of the two Palestinian Intifadat differ in a number
of critical respects, and any comparison should be made with
circumspection. Perhaps the most visible difference is in the relative
militarization of the second Intifada. While the first Intifada involved
mostly unarmed Palestinian civilians and achieved high levels of mass
mobilization, the second Intifada involved considerably greater armed
violence, including, infamously, suicide bombings, that consigned the vast
majority of Palestinian citizens to the sidelines. There is at least a
suggestion in this contrast that a non-violent uprising has greater
democratizing potential than a violent one.75
Israel, of course, violently repressed both Palestinian Intifadat, although
it employed vastly more lethal weapons in the second than in the first. This
calls to mind another, darker interpretation of the consequences of the
Palestinian uprisings: both offered Israel opportunities to consolidate its
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control over the West Bank, although in different ways. Indeed, Israeli
journalist Amira Hass argues that the Israeli right wing is spoiling for a third
intifada: “[n]ot because they want an intifada, but because they want to
suppress it. They want an outbreak to occur, while the Arab world is mired
in civil wars both hot and cold. Their interest is in reaping demographic and
territorial dividends from that uprising. How? For example in a mass
expulsion of Palestinians to Jordan—the “Palestinian State” according to
many a settler.”76
In some respects, then, the challenges to Palestinian democracy seem
only to have mounted. Whether the Palestinian people are able to meet these
challenges will only be known over time, and likely after long, bitter, and
painful struggle.
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